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Abstract:  
The revolutionary changes in information technology (IT), globalisation and financial 
innovation have overturned the Solow productivity paradox and spawned a New Economy 
(NE) in Australia in the late 1990s. Both growth accounting estimates and the use of the 
information superhighway ranks Australia next to the USA as a NE. Australia is an avid user 
but not a producer of IT that propels the NE. The debate on the need for a new paradigm for 
the new economy on the grounds that key mechanisms of the old paradigm have become 
obsolete is reviewed. The breakdown of the short-run Phillips curve tradeoff and the 
redundancy of the long-run speed limits to growth are examined and dismissed as poppycock 
both on theoretical and empirical grounds. The IT technology because it is subject to severe 
diminishing returns and problems of information overload fails to rank with the great 
inventions of the past and will not be a harbinger of the Third Industrial Revolution. 
Nonetheless, on the basis of the ‘delay hypothesis’ the dismissal of the case for a new 
paradigm for the NE may be premature at this stage. The paper also examines the puzzling 
nose-dive of the dollar during the first half of the year 2001. This occurred despite the strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals and the emergent NE. The paper concludes commenting on the 
policy reaction function for a small open NE committed to inflation targeting. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The investment in information technology (IT) has brought about revolutionary changes in 
methods of production and distribution and has catalysed the resource based manufacturing 
economy or the ‘old economy’ into a ‘new economy’ where symbol crunching has become the 
major source of value-adding and productivity growth. Australia has invested in IT and 
reorganised production and has emerged as leading user of the Internet for electronic commerce. 
The IT investments have resulted in complementary innovations leading to a resurgence in 
productivity growth and a reduction in the costs imposed by the ‘tyranny of distance’. In the 
mid-1990s these revolutionary changes due to IT investments combined with the processes of 
globalisation and financial innovations reversed the productivity slowdown witnessed over the 
previous two decades leading to the observation that  ‘ there are computers everywhere but not in 
the productivity statistics’ (Solow, 1987). The reversal of the Solow productivity paradox was 
due to the joint impact of Moore’s law, the doubling of computing power every 18 months, and 
Metcalfe’s law, the increase of the value of a network by value of the square of every new user 
(Economist, 2000). Although Australia was major user of IT unlike USA it was not a producer of 
IT hardware and goods and therefore it lacked the high-tech stocks and shares that lured the 
portfolio investors to the ‘new economy ‘ in the USA. Australia because it lacked a vibrant IT 
producing sector was tagged pejoratively as an ‘old economy’. It failed to attract the capital 
inflows that poured into high-tech stocks and shares in the USA strengthening the US dollar and 
at the same time weakening the Australia dollar in the latter part of the 1990s. 
 
The paper is motivated by the need to shed light on the pros and cons on the case for a new 
paradigm for the NE. Section II of the paper presents the stylised facts on how the Australian 
economy has been reshaped into a NE. Stylised facts based on growth accounting methods and 
on the use of the information superhighway show that Australia has arrived as a NE trailing 
behind USA. Section III reviews the case advanced for a new paradigm for the NE. Both short-
run Phillips curve tradeoffs and the long-run speed limits to growth prescribed in the 
conventional paradigm are reviewed. Section IV finds no support for a new paradigm on the 
grounds of mis-measurement of key variables in the conventional paradigm. Nor is there clear-
cut evidence that IT is a general purpose technology in the same league as the great inventions of 
the past. Therefore, the case for a new paradigm for the NE is dismissed as poppycock. Section 
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V reviews critically the puzzling nosedive of the dollar during the first half of 2001, despite 
strong fundamentals and an emerging NE. Section VI concludes providing some policy 
perspectives  
 
II.  THE NEW ECONOMY 
 
The emergence of the New Economy (NE) in Australia in the mid-1990s is revealed by the 
decomposition of productivity statistics based on growth accounting techniques1. Estimates 
based on growth accounting show that Australia’s labour productivity doubled in the second half 
of 1990s compared to the first half of the decade (Parham 1999, Gruen 2000, Simon, 2001). 
Most of the labour productivity resurgence was attributable to both capital deepening due to 
investment in IT and the surge in total factor productivity due to the spillover effects of IT use. 
Total labour productivity refers to the increase in output per labour unit, capital deepening 
defines the growth of capital per labour unit and total factor productivity (TFP) refers to growth 
in labour productivity due to increase in output, due to complementary innovations and 
reorganisation, whilst using the same factor inputs. The growth accounting methodology used to 
decompose labour productivity growth into the constituents according to some analysts fail to 
measure adequately the contribution of IT capital to the increase of productivity that underpins 
the emergence of the NE. 
                                                          
1 Growth accounting methodology  
The methodology underpinning the decomposition of growth of labour productivity to capital deepening and total 
factor productivity could be explained as follows. 
The growth accounting equation (1) postulates that growth rate of GDP (∆Y/Y) equals the growth rate of capital 
(∆K/K), labour (∆N/N) weighted by their respective factor shares (θ) and (1−θ) plus total factor productivity (∆A/A) 
and is derived by differentiating a Cobb-Douglas production function under assumptions of perfect competition, 
constant returns to scale, etc. giving the relationship shown below: 
Given Y: Output. L: Labour, K: Capital, θ: Factor share. 
∆Y/Y = θ ∆K/K  +(1−θ) ∆N/N +  ∆A/A      (1)  
The growth of labour productivity or output per worker is derived by subtracting from both sides of equation (1) 
∆N/N and showing that it is the sum of the growth of capital deepening and growth of total factor productivity as 
shown in equation (2) below: 
(∆Y/Y− ∆N/N) = θ (∆K/K − ∆N/N) +  ∆A/A   (2) 
Notating the per capita terms in small case letters we show that labour productivity equals capital deepening and 
total factor productivity in equation (3) furthermore we can decompose capital deepening into the contributions of 
ITC and other capital thus:  ( θ∆k/k  =θ1∆k1/k1 +  θ2∆k2/k2)  
∆y/y = θ1∆k1/k1 +  θ2∆k2/k2  +  ∆A/A        (3) 
Nearly half of the increase in labour productivity (∆y/y) was due to capital deepening (θ∆k/k) resulting from the 
application of ITC (θ1∆k1/k1), about one-fifth was due to growth of total factor productivity (TFP) or the Solow 
residual. (∆A/A) and relevant details are reported in Table 1. 
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Based on the growth accounting methodology the doubling of labour productivity in Australia in 
the second half of 1990s compared to the first half and decomposition of this growth into 
contributions by IT capital deepening and the growth of labour productivity as estimated by 
Simon (2001) is shown in Table 1. The comparison with growth accounting estimates for the 
USA by Oliner and Sichel (2000) reveals that Australia outperformed the USA in the NE 
productivity growth stakes in the latter half of the 1990s. 
 
Table 1 Labour Productivity Decomposition. 
 
Growth accounting estimate Australia (market sector) USA (non-farm business) 
Growth rate % p.a.  91-95 96-99 %∆ 91-95 96-99 %∆ 
IT Capital (∆k1) 0.9 1.3 44 0.5 1.0 100 
Other capita (∆k2) & labour quality 0.4 0.6 15 0.5 0.4 -20 
Total factor productivity TFP (∆A/A) 0.8 2.2 175 0.5 1.2 140 
Labour productivity (∆y/y)  2.1 4.1 95 1.5 2.6 73 
 
Source: Gruen (2001) and Simon (2001): p.68 base 
 
According to microeconomic empirics or firm level case studies, the growth accounting method 
seriously underestimates the productivity contributions of IT by failing to value intangible capital 
accumulation due to complementary innovations generated by IT investments. Stock market 
valuation of IT capital is 10 times more than that of non-IT capital, after discounting for the 
effect of high-tech bubbles. It is pointed out that when IT investments are estimated for the 
whole economy using a Tobin’s q type of measure2 the valuations of IT investments are 10 times 
greater than valuations from non-IT investments. The resultant Tobin’s q exceeds unity 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000: 81). Australia’s speeding up the information superhighway as 
measured by its uptake of various types of e-commerce in the late 1990s was nothing short of 
spectacular. The electronic transactions on the information superhighway can be classified into 
different categories (B2B, B2C and G2B) as shown in the matrix (Table 2).  
 
Australia occupied a top rank in the first quartile, in the OECD league of 27 countries, in terms 
of e-commerce indicators such as secure servers and Internet hosts (See Table 3). In the OECD  
                                                          
2 Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q = [Stock market value of IT investment]/ [Replacement cost of installed IT investment] 
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 league it ranked third both in terms of IT expenditure as a ratio of GDP and in terms of Internet 
access costs. It ranked eighth in Internet hosts per thousand inhabitants, sixth in terms of PC 
penetration.  
 
Table 2 Matrix of e-commerce transactions  
 
e-commerce Business(B) Consumer (C) Government(G) 
Business (B) B2B B2C B2G 
Consumer (C) C2B C2C C2G 
Government(G) G2B G2C G2G 
 
Table 3 Number of Internet Secure servers and Hosts  
 
Country/ Internet Secure serversa/mn Pop (Rank) Internet hosts/th Pop (Rank) 
Australia 119 (3) 55 (8) 
USA 170 (2) 160 (1) 
OECD Average 60 54 
OECD Total 66810 60502 
 
Notes: Secure servers allow users to engage in e-commerce using encrypted credit cards for financial 
transactions. Internet hosts refers to a computer system with an Internet Protocol (IP) linked to the network. 
Source: OECD www.oecd.org.dsti/itcm/ Coppel (2000).  
 
Despite Australia’s adoption of IT on a grand scale which ranked Australia next to the US top-
seed as a NE, there were some noteworthy difference between Australia and the USA. Australia 
lacked an IT production sector. It neither produced semiconductors or other high-tech gear nor 
could it boast of a high-tech hub like the Silicon Valley Australia also was not an assembler of 
labour intensive electronic products generating IT jobs as in South Korea or Czechoslovakia. 
This was reflected in the low shares of IT related employment and value added by this sector to 
total business activity. IT related employment and value added in Australia was 10 and 14 times 
lower than in USA (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 Share of IT Production (1998) 
 
Manufacturing Employment Value-added 
Australia 0.13 0.14 
US 1.31 1.90 
Ratio AUS/US 10 14 
UK 1.37 2.56 
Ratio AUS/UK 10 18 
 
Source: OECD (2000) Measuring the ICT Sector, OECD Paris. 
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OECD studies (OECD 2000) indicate Australia outperformed USA the leading NE, in the 
productivity stakes, despite the lack of IT producing sector (Gust and Marquez 2000). 
 
III. A NEW PARADIGM 
 
The relevance of rival macroeconomic paradigms or the conventional wisdom in the form of the 
New Classical, New Keynesian and Real Business Cycle theories have been tested using 
Australian stylised facts (Karunaratne 1999). Rather than retread ground already covered, here 
we focus on the two-pronged attack mounted by the NE enthusiasts on the conventional 
paradigm. The first prong of the NE enthusiasts attack is trained on the short-run cyclical 
transmission mechanisms of the conventional paradigm as exemplified by the Phillips curve 
tradeoff. The second prong of the attack is trained on the long-run speed limits to growth or the 
production potential of the economy as predicted by the neoclassical growth model.  
 
First, it is alleged that the emergence of the NE has caused the breakdown of the short-run 
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment as postulated by the original Phillips curve 
(Phillips 1958). It needs to be noted that the expectations augmented Phillips curve (EAPC) 
positing no long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment evolved later in the deft 
hands of Phelps (1968) and Friedman (1968). The EAPC a core component of the conventional 
paradigm took a battering, during the stagflation of the 1970s, when inflation and unemployment 
rose simultaneously in the face of supply shocks. Then EAPC was banished into oblivion from 
the policy arena. It was chastised as “an empirical failure on a grand scale’ (Lucas and Sargent 
1978) and “a professional embarrassment” (Galbraith 1998). The Phillips curve was not sighted 
during the episodes of monetary targeting (1975-85) and during the era of the check-list 
approach when discretion guided policy prescriptions in the late 1980s (Johnston, 1985). 
However, with the adoption of inflation targeting in 1993, the Phillips curve has made a 
comeback both as an important intellectual framework for policy analysis and as an empirical 
tool for testing the robustness of policy prescriptions (Gruen et al. 1999). The Phillips curve also 
figures prominently in contemporary macroeconomic texts as an important analytical tool in the 
context of the conventional paradigm (Mankiw 2001, Dornbusch et al. 2001). A skeletal history 
of the evolution of the Phillips curve in Australia is recounted in Table 5. 
 
 8 
The emergence of the NE allegedly caused a breakdown of the short-run Phillips curve tradeoff 
because in the NE unemployment can be reduced with igniting inflation. Therefore, the NE 
rhetoric proclaims the death of inflation and the business cycle (Boole 1996). The NE has stood 
stagflation on its head and at the same time knocked the wheels off the short-run Phillips curve. 
The policy prescriptions grounded out from the old paradigm according to the NE enthusiasts are 
flawed as they stifle expansionary policies that could deliver higher employment and output 
without kindling inflation. Therefore, the NE hype calls for a new paradigm to meet the policy 
challenges posed by the NE.  
 
Table 5 History of the evolution Phillips Curve in Australia 
 
Period Type Policy Source 
1960 Inflation -Unemployment tradeoff Wage arbitration Phillips (1958) 
1975-86 No tradeoff (stagflation) Monetary targeting Friedman (1968) 
1989-90 No tradeoff  Check-list  Jonston (1985) 
1993-01 Tradeoff Inflation targeting Gruen et al (1999) 
 
The labour market version of the EPAC has been presented in terms of symbolic logic3. Here the 
conventional tradeoff in the Phillips curve postulates, cet. par., when unemployment exceeds the 
non-accelerating rate of inflation (NAIRU) inflation could be reduced below expected inflation. 
But the NE hype claims that in the NE both unemployment and inflation can be reduced 
simultaneously as the hypothesised inflation unemployment tradeoff in the conventional 
paradigm has been rendered obsolete. Further insights on the break-down of the Phillips curve 
are revealed through the supply side version of the Phillips curve. The supply-side Phillips curve 
can be obtained by substituting in the Okun’s Law4 relationship that links the output gap to the 
deviation of unemployment rate from NAIRU, which states that β%  reduction in unemployment 
                                                          
3 Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve (EAPC) 
π  = πe - β( u-u*) + ε  (1)   Labour market version.  
where π:  inflation,  πe: expected inflation, u: unemployment rate,, u*: natural rate or NAIRU (non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment, ε: a supply shock, β: is the response of inflation to the cyclical demand-push on 
inflation, measured by deviation of unemployment for the natural rate.  
Cet. par assumption assumes away supply shocks (ε). 
According to the conventional paradigm if u < u* then π > πe. That is, reduction of unemployment triggers inflation. 
In the NE it is claimed that cet. par. u < u* and π < πe can occur simultaneously. 
This leads to a breakdown of the tradeoff and death of inflation and the business cycle. 
4 Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve (EPAC). 
Substitute from Okun’s Law -β (u-u*) = 1/α( y-y*) in labour market version of EPAC and obtain: 
π  = πe + 1/α( y-y*) + ε  Supply version of EPAC    
According to the conventional paradigm if y > y* then π > πe.  
In the NE it is argued that y> y* can occur with π < πe because the NE has raised the speed limit y*  
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below NAIRU can deliver 1/α % increase in output above potential. Thus, according to the 
conventional paradigm rapid growth of output can spark off inflationary pressures. The NE hype 
contends that the speed limits of growth or potential output has been raised by the NE. Therefore, 
output can be increased without overheating the economy. This leads to the conjecture that the 
old paradigm is passé in the NE and ground out flawed policy prescriptions making the economy 
perform below its capacity output or productive potential. 
 
The second prong of the NE attack on the conventional paradigm is trained on the trend growth 
rate or the speed limits of growth. In the conventional paradigm the trend growth rate or the 
speed limits to growth were grounded out from the neoclassical paradigm or the Solow-Swan 
growth model (Solow 1956, Swan 1956). The case for a new paradigm for the NE is presented in 
the form of two variants related to low run growth both alleging that the speed limits to growth 
have been raised by the NE. The first variant contends that raising of the speed limits to growth 
in the neoclassical or Solow-Swan model enables the expansion of output by increased IT 
investment without running into diminishing returns to IT capital and igniting the fires of 
inflation as enunciated in the conventional paradigm. The second variant is based on new growth 
theory or the endogenous growth model (Romer 1986, Aghion 1994). The Romer endogenous 
growth model conceptualises capital more broadly than just physical capital in the neoclassical 
model. In the NE, capital incorporates IT capital which like human capital can generate positive 
externalities and increasing returns. The complementary innovations associated with IT, x-
efficiency from reorganisation and positive network externalities contribute to the manifestation 
of increasing returns. Therefore, the endogenous growth model, in the NE has constant marginal 
productivity of capital5 rather than diminishing marginal productivity capital as in the Solow-
Swan model. Therefore the NE can enjoy persistent growth without crashing into any speed 
limits to growth. Furthermore, it is conjectured that once the NE reached a critical mass it could 
hop on to a nonlinear trajectory and takeoff on a virtuous circle of self-sustained growth (Kelly 
1997) and it is argued that the dynamics of the NE could be better understood through the 
insights from evolutionary complexity theory rather than from the conventional paradigm 
(Mandeville, 2000).  
                                                          
5 Endogenous growth model 
Let Y: output, K: Capital including IT, A: constant 
 Y= AK 
 ∆K = sY - δK (Capital accumulation= investment - depreciation) 
∆Y/Y = ∆K/Y= sA - δK (persistent growth if sA>δ)  
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The NE enthusiasts also press the case for a new paradigm on empirical grounds. It is alleged the 
official statistics mis-measure the productivity resurgence delivered by the IT revolution. The 
mis-measurement claims of the NE hype can be illuminated using the ball- park figures in  
Table 6. Okun’s Law6 under the assumption that unemployment rate is at the natural rate 
(NAIRU) predicts that percentage growth rate of potential output or the speed limits to growth is 
equal to the sum of the growth rate of labour productivity and growth rate of the labour force (i.e. 
Symbolically; given Y: output, N: labour, ∆: change. The speed limits are estimated as: ∆Y/Y = 
 ∆(Y/N) + ∆Ν = 4 % + 1% = 5%). The NE proponents contend that this 5^% growth rate which 
is coterminous with the growth rate in the published official statistics is a gross underestimate 
due to the mis-measurement of labour productivity growth. Some of the reasons for mis-
measurement have been recounted earlier. This underestimation of productivity obscures the true 
prowess of the economy and also gives flawed policy guidelines on the basis of the old 
paradigm. If the labour productivity statistics were 6 % rather than 4 % per annum then the 
growth rate or speed limits would be 7% growth rate per annum. According to the NE 
enthusiasts the speed limits prescribed by the conventional paradigm forces policymakers to 
apply the policy breaks prematurely pulling the economy short of its full production potential 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 6 Ball park figures for measuring the speed limit of growth 
 
Macro growth rate (%) p.a. 1995 2000 Proximate source 
Labour productivity ∆(Y/N) 2 4 Gruen, Simon, PC 
Labour force ∆(N) 1 1 ABS 
Old speed limit: ∆(Y/N) + ∆(/N) 3 5  
NAIRU (u*) 6 6 Gruen et al. (1999) 
Labour productivity in NE 3 6 Guesstimate 
NE speed limit: ∆(Y/N) + ∆(/N) 3 7 Guesstimate 
Underling Inflation  (π)  8 2 ABS 
 
Notes. 
According to Okun’s Law, when u=u* or Y=Y*, then potential growth rate of output or the speed limit is 
given by the sum of the growth rate of labour productivity and the growth rate of the labour force. 
 
                                                          
6 Okun’s Law, speed limits to growth = potential growth 
Okun’s Law predicts to maintain a constant unemployment rate 
potential growth rate = Labour productivity growth x labour force growth rate 
∆Y/Y = ∆(Y/N) x ∆N 
where Y: output, N: labour force 
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IV. POPPYCOCK 
 
The emergence of a NE in Australia appears incontrovertible on the basis of the stylised facts 
presented in relation to the productivity pick-up and the use of the information superhighway as 
a consequence of the IT investment in the mid-1990s. However, the claim that the NE has 
rendered the conventional paradigm obsolete paving the way for a new paradigm for policy 
making in the NE remains a questionable proposition. Mainstream economists after a cool look 
at the NE hype for a new paradigm for the NE dismiss it as poppycock, first by rejecting that 
mis-measurement in the official statistics fail to knock the wheels off the conventional paradigm 
(Blinder 1997) and second, IT is not a general purpose technology (GPT) and therefore fails to 
live up to the stature of past inventions (Gordon 2000). Overall the case for new paradigm for the 
NE is rejected on the grounds that “technology changes but economic laws do not” (Shapiro and 
Varian 1999).  
 
The existence of mis-measurement of productivity in the official statistics during a period of 
rapid technological change is readily acknowledged by the defenders of the conventional 
paradigm. 
 
However, since the mis-measurement affects all the variables in the Phillips curve and the 
Solow-Swan growth model equally neither the tradeoffs nor the speed limits in the conventional 
paradigm are invalidated as claimed by the proponents of the NE. However, it is conceded 
measurement errors are rife in the productivity statistics and there at least six ways in which they 
create measurement bias as discussed below. 
 
First, the consumer price index (CPI) overestimates inflation because of an upward bias and 
therefore underestimates real output which is nominal output divided by the CPI. Second, the use 
of chain-weighted measures of GDP gives less value to IT compared to the base- weight index 
because the latter gives higher values to IT by ignoring the price reductions due to the operation 
of Moore’s law and Metcalfe’s laws. Third, downsizing whilst increasing labour productivity at 
firm level depresses productivity at an economy-wide level. Fourth, the wealth-based estimation 
of capital stock using the current market value of assets, as used in growth accounting 
methodology, leads to serious underestimation of the income producing capacity of the existing 
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capital stock. Fifth, the imputations for the large unmeasured part of the economy based on the 
measurement of productivity for a small segment of the economy - the durable manufacturing 
sector, can be misleading. Sixth, the ‘tyranny of the missing anecdote’ or the bias to measure 
productivity success stories whilst sweeping under the carpet productivity debacles. Sixth, the 
Solow productivity paradox may not have been reversed as asserted by the NE enthusiasts.  
 
The mis-measurement of the productivity contribution of IT due to rapid changes in quality can 
be rectified by calculating constant quality adjusted prices using hedonic regression methods. 
Hedonic7 measures regress price of an IT good on price of quality attributes over time (Triplett 
1989). For example, the latest Pentium IV computer with superior attributes such as higher 
speed, more memory, better modems, may cost the same as a superseded Pentium II model. The 
improvement in quality of the computer translates into a price reduction and this is captured by 
the hedonic pricing methods. 
 
The dismissal of NE case for a new paradigm as poppycock gets much support from the strident 
critique the techno-sceptics lead by Gordon (2000). First, the productivity surge that has propped 
up the NE is shown to be a mere cyclical phenomenon and not an upward shift in the trend 
growth rate. Second, it can be argued that IT is subject to a rapid law of diminishing returns, 
since the exponential growth of IT technology runs into the fixed “cost of thinking” or the failure 
of the human brain to keep pace with Moore and Metcalfe laws. Third, the IT revolution and the 
associated globalisation forces affect only about one-fifth of the tradable sectors of the economy 
whilst bypassing the large nontradeables sector old economy that dominates the whole economy. 
Fourth, the IT and globalisation results in a zero-sum game which creates no net gains when 
adverse Stolper-Samuelson effects of freer trade and ‘Marx striking again’ effects of 
technological change are netted out (Karunaratne, 1999). Fifth, the massive price reduction in IT 
due to Moore’s and Metcalfe’s law leads to the substitution of the more costly IT by cheaper 
alternatives. Such substitution effects are old hat and therefore make no case for a new paradigm 
(Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000). Sixth, IT may create serious problems of information overload 
                                                          
7 Hedonic price measures 
Ln Pi,t = Σjβj Aj, i,t + ΣτδtD,t + εt  
where Pi,t: price of good i at time t, Aj,i,t: attribute j of good i at time t, Dt: time dummy. 
The hedonic approach uses the implicit prices (βj) of the attributes Aj, i,t demanded by users. The constant quality 
price index can be estimated from the antilog of δt. 
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because of the phenomenon summed up in: ‘What Intel giveth Microsoft taketh away’. Also it 
could result in much directly unproductive activity (DUP) activity due to mindless net surfing 
and sheer idle capacity because of Herbert Simon phenomenon: “A wealth of information creates 
a poverty of attention”. Seventh, IT does not fall into the same league as the great inventions of 
the past as a general-purpose technology (GPT) like the steam engine or the electric motor. 
Therefore, contrary to the NE hype, the IT revolution will not usher the big bang ‘ Third 
Industrial Revolution’ as trumpeted, but rather it will peter out as a whimper. Furthermore, no 
cohesive case for a new paradigm has been established by the proponents of the NE, rather it is 
all economic snake oil (Buiter, 2000). 
 
Although the case for a new paradigm for the NE has not been persuasively presented, a 
fundamental change has occurred in the Australian economic landscape due to IT investment. 
But, it is too early to tell whether this change is transitory or permanent phenomenon. The 
benefits of IT may be yet to come since inventions such as electricity delivered after a lag of 50 
years according to the “delay hypothesis” (David, 1990) - a hypothesis that is bitterly contested 
by Gordon (2000). Therefore, rather than dismissing the NE case for a new paradigm as sheer 
poppycock, it would be more prudent to adopt a more cautious approach. The statistics for 
testing the claims for a new paradigm for the NE are still in the pipeline and therefore the jury is 
still out deliberating the verdict.  
 
V.  THE DOLLAR PUZZLE 
 
Despite strong macroeconomic fundamentals and Australia’s emergent NE, the exchange rate, 
the most important price of an open economy virtually nose-dived during the first half of 2001. 
Both when measured in terms of the bilateral USD/AUD or as trade weighted basket of 
currencies, the trade weighted index (TWI) the dollar plummeted in value and crashed through 
the psychological barrier of 0.50US cents and reached an all time low of nearly 0.48USD during 
the end of the first quarter of 2001. This was a huge fall of about 60% from the dizzy heights of 
0.80USD recorded in 1996. The plummeting dollar triggered a heated debate on the proximate 
causes for the downward slide. Some concerned observers urged the Reserve Bank to “lean 
against the wind” or intervene to prop -up the dollar.  
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In this section we review some of the conventional exchange rate theoretic explanations based on 
macroeconomic fundamentals proffered to explain the dollar puzzle. We also review the new 
fangled explanation for the plummeting dollar based on the perception that Australia was an ‘old 
economy’ rather than a NE. Equity investors, both portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI), 
were not attracted to Australia because it did not have the NE high -tech equities as in the USA. 
Therefore Australia was type cast as an ‘old economy’. The fact that investors continued to 
invest in the USA even after the ‘tech-wreck’ in March 2000 suggests that the past momentum 
played a role in keeping the dollar on a downward slide despite its strengthening against the 
USD. 
 
During most of the 1990s the Australian economy exhibited strong fundamentals and it 
weathered the Asian currency crisis (mid-1997) with a resilience that was unrivalled by other 
members in the OECD league. Australia’s strong fundamentals were manifest in the 
unprecedented spell of GDP growth that lasted for more than a decade without driving the 
economy into a technical recession. Core inflation, which had hovered around the double-digit 
mark at the beginning of the decade, had been pegged to just over 2% at the end of the decade. 
The unemployment rate had stabilised around a natural rate or NAIRU of 6%. The external 
position of the economy was relatively sound as indicated by fundamentals such as the current 
account deficit as the ratio of GDP which cycled around 4.5% and the debt to GDP ratio of 40%. 
Both indicators and the debt servicing to exports ratio were heading in a downward direction 
(Table 7). Based on such a track-record of strong fundamentals, the conventional exchange rate 
theories would have predicted a strong dollar appreciation rather than massive depreciation that 
eventuated in 2001. The nose dive of the dollar by about 33% in terms of the USD and by 13%  
 
Table 7 Macroeconomic fundamentals in the NE 
 
Decade 1990s Average 
Y: Growth GDP 4.2 % 
π: CPI inflation 2.3% 
u: Unemp. Rate 6.0% 
CAD/GDP  4.5% 
Debt/GDP 40% 
BD/GDP - 0.0 
 
Notes: 
CPI: Consumer Price Index. CAD: Current Account Deficit. BD: Budget deficit  
Source: Treasury Round-Up Winter 2001, RBA Bulletin Dec. 2000 
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in terms of the TWI was one mighty puzzle. It provoked a heated debate about the proximate 
causes behind the plummeting dollar.  
 
Among the conventional explanations of the dollar puzzle we review theories based on 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Modern exchange rate theories regard the exchange rate as an 
asset price. Its current value is determined by expected future value of fundamentals. First, the 
prediction of the dollar value, the exchange rate, is based on purchasing power parity (PPP) 
theory and its corollary, the law of one price (LOOP). Second, the prediction of the dollar value 
based on risk neutral uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition is examined. Here domestic and 
foreign bonds are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Third, the empirics of a typical error 
correction model (ECM) of exchange rate behaviour based on fundamentals that are important 
for a commodity exporting nation is reviewed. Fourth, the role of chartists who predict the 
exchange rate based on past trends is reviewed on the basis of a typical technical trading rule. 
Fifth, the exchange rate observed at any point of time is the upshot of fundamentalist and 
chartists activity and this can be stylised in terms of a Markov Regime Switching (MRS) model. 
Empirics from the MRS model cautions against the use of activist policies to prop- up the falling 
dollar on the grounds that it could be destabilising and counterproductive. 
 
First, based on LOOP, a corollary of PPP theory, the price of a homogenous good like a Big Mac 
should cost the same in Australia and USA. However, the Australian dollar (AUD) was during 
the latter half of 2001, about 50% undervalued compared to the US dollar (USD)8. The weak 
AUD was the flip side of the strong USD. However, it is widely recognised that the exchange 
rate, an asset price in the short- run can overshoot its long-run equilibrium value as predicted by 
the PPP theory, in response to an exogenous shock or “news” or new information about 
fundamentals. According to the ‘sticky price’ model the overshooting occurs in the short-run due 
to asymmetric speeds of adjustments in the goods and asset markets. But in the long-run the 
exchange rate reverts to the PPP determined equilibrium value (Dornbusch 1976).  
                                                          
8 Purchasing power parity / law of one price (Economist, 5th September, 2001). 
The price of a hamburger during 2001Q2 was 1.50 USD in USA, 3.00AUD in Australia, the exchange rate was 
S=AUD/USD=2.00. Therefore according to the law one price the value of a hamburger when converted to AUD 
should cost the same. The ratio of the foreign to domestic price according to the law of one price should give Q= 
SP*/P = 1. But for the above prices Q = SP*/P = 2.00x 1.50/ 2 = 1.50 
The US burger was 50% over valued or Australian burger was 50% under valued according to PPP theory. 
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Second, the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition predicts that expected depreciation of the 
dollar, under the assumption of risk neutrality, is equal to the differential between domestic and 
foreign interest rates. The interest differential for long-term bonds between Australia and USA 
had narrowed from 3% in mid-1990s to a mere 0.05% during 2000Q4 (Table 8). Therefore, 
according to the UIP condition 9 the dollar should have depreciated only by just 0.05% and not  
by the massive 50% as predicted by LOOP and PPP. The UIP notoriously mis-predicts exchange 
movements because it has failed to take account of risk aversion of investors (Froot and Thaler 
1990). The fact that there was massive reversal of capital inflows during the latter part of 1990s, 
indicate that the risk premium on Australian bonds had risen rapidly. 
 
Table 8 Exchange rates and Macroeconomic Fundamentals 
 
Quarter 2000Q1 2000Q2 2000Q3 2000Q4 2001Q1 2000Q2 
USD/AUD 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.51 
TWI 54.5 52.4 51.6 49.7 47.4 49.7 
π : Inflation (CPI) 2.8 3.2 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.0 
π∗ : Infl. US 4.0 0.8 0.9 0.2 1.4 1.2 
i =Aus 10bond 6.72 6.27 6.24 5.80 5.59 6.24 
i* = US 1 bond 6.41 6.28 6.03 5.75   
 
Sources: OECD and The Reserve Bank Australia. http://www.rba.gov.au  
 
Capital inflows which had averaged AUD 4.3 billion per year, during the five years 1992Q2 -
1997Q2 reversed into a massive outflow of AUD 5.0 billion per year during the subsequent two 
years. The lure of the robust NE of the USA and the increasing risk of investing in Australia may 
have inflicted a double whammy triggering a capital flow reversal in the late 1990s. This, in turn, 
contributed to the massive weakening of the dollar.  
 
Third, the behaviour of the exchange rate could be explained parsimoniously in terms of 
fundamentals such as the interest differential and the commodity terms of trade using an error  
 
                                                          
9 Uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition 
The expected depreciation of the spot exchange rate S=AUD/USD is given by the differential of the domestic 
interest rate (i) and the foreign interest rate (i*) and the risk factor ρ =0 if investors are risk neutral and positive if 
investors are risk averse. 
∆Se = (i* -i) + ρ    
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correction model (ECM) model10  
 
Fourth, further light could be shed on the dollar puzzle based on the activities of chartists who 
use past trends to predict exchange rate movements. A typical technical rule based on past trends 
is the moving average cross (MAC)11. This emits a foreign exchange buy signal when the short-
term moving average crosses the long-term moving average from below (a golden cross). The 
chartist activities based on technical rules can impart a momentum and cause the exchange rate 
to overshoot the long-run equilibrium predicted by the PPP theory in the short-run. The dollar 
plummet during 2001 could be regarded as an overshoot due to the momentum created by 
technical trading activities of the chartists.  
                                                          
 
The Markov Regime Switching (MRS) model combines the forecasts of chartists and 
fundamentalists’ equations to estimate the transition probabilities that determine the exchange 
rate regime shifts. The MRS model empirics indicate for post-float period chartists dominated 
the foreign exchange activities during tranquil period and the fundamentalists dominated the 
foreign exchange market during turbulent periods. Moreover, the massive depreciation observed 
2001 be a chartist generated overshoot and left to free market forces under the floating regime, 
would be reversed by activities of fundamentalists. Therefore, interventionist policies to prop- up 
the plummeting dollar are not supported by the empirics of the MRS model (Djoudad et al. 
2000).  
 
Nevertheless, the case for intervention to halt the slide of the dollar was mounted on the basis of 
the new fangled argument that classified Australia as an ‘old economy’ compared to the USA. 
Whilst conceding that there was such misperception, the Governor of the RBA observed that it 
was out of kilter with the stylised facts for (Macfarlane 2000) as recounted in section II of the 
paper. Nonetheless, Australia is not a producer of semi-conductors nor does Australia have a 
10 Fundamentalist model & Chartist technical rule 
A typical error-correction model fitted to fundamentals in a commodity exporting nation such as Australia would 
assume the following form: 
 ∆qτ = α1 +  α2(i -i*)+ α3tott-1 non-energy+ α4tott-1energy +  α5ECMt-1 + εt,  
where, real exchange rate (qt) = etPt*/Pt; tott: terms of trade (energy or non-energy commodities), εt: error  
 ∆qτ = β1 +  β2(i -i*)+ α3 MAt-1 short-term - α4MAt-1long-term + α5tott-1long-term + εt,  
11 Modified Taylor’s Rule 
  it = r0 +  πt-1 + γ1 (πt-1 - πΤ t ) + γ2 (yt-1 - y∗ t-1 ) +γ3 (εt-1 - ε∗ t-1 ) 
it: nominal interest rate, i0: real interest rate, πt-1: inflation rate over past year, T: superscript refers to target. y: real 
output, y*: potential output ; ετ−1 :: real exchange rate, ε∗τ−1 :  equilibrium real exchange rate, γ :  reaction parameter. 
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Silicon Valley. It is only a small producer of telecommunications ware. Australia also does not 
have labour intensive electronic assembly industries which provide high employment to export-
oriented labour abundant economies such as South Korea or Malaysia. Therefore, Australia lacks 
the portfolio of high tech equities to lure investors and risk-seeking speculators. However, 
Australia may have a comparative advantage IT intensive service industries that require high 
skills and capital and promotion of such industries could overcome Australia’s deficiency as a 
low producer of IT goods. In the concluding section we dwell on some policy perspectives that 
are relevant for implementing monetary policy in the emerging NE given the commitment to 
inflation targeting. 
 
 
VI. POLICY  
 
Australia is a small open economy, a price- taker in the world market. Currently monetary policy 
is implemented to achieve a pre-announced core inflation target in the range of 2-3% over the 
business cycle. The nominal interest rate (the overnight cash rate) is the operational instrument 
of monetary policy. There is widespread agreement, that given the commitment to an inflation-
targeting framework, the Taylor rule is an appropriate policy reaction function (Taylor 1993). In 
the context of the focus on the exchange rate a modified Taylor rule incorporating the rate 
channel for a small open economy as suggested by (de Bouwer and O’Regan 1997) is considered 
relevant. The interest rate smoothing to achieve the inflation target would, given the real interest 
rate, respond to deviation of inflation from the target, output from potential and the exchange 
rate from its equilibrium rate. 
 
However, the empirics from macroeconomic fundamentals and the MRS model caution against 
the pursuit of interventionist policies to halt the dollar plummet. Also it has been emphasised that 
the focus of monetary policy in a small open economy should not attempt to offset transitory 
exchange rate fluctuations, however large they may be, as this would result in inefficiency in the 
sense of more variability in other macro variables such as output (Svensson 1998). Nonetheless, 
during the big nose-dive of the dollar during the first half 2001, the RBA appears to have 
engaged in covert sterilised intervention, departing from its usual practice of leaning with the 
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wind rather than against it. The recent analytics and empirics on inflation targeting in a small 
open economy appear to lend support to such activist policies (Ryan and Thompson 2000). 
 
Next, some brief comments are offered on the ‘pass-through’ perspective and the productivity 
consequences of a prolonged dollar tumble. First, the ‘pass through’ perspective which maps out 
that depreciation by increasing import price would unleash inflation would also implicitly 
support activist monetary policy to counter the dollar plummet. However, contrary to the 
predictions of the pass-through perspective inflation did not rear its ugly head during the 
downward slide of the dollar. This is because the ‘pass-through’ perspective may be flawed as it 
fails to function when NE type supply- side shocks or real demand shocks hit the economy 
(Karunaratne 2001). Second, the apprehension that depreciation would widen the productivity 
gap between Australia and USA as has been observed in the case of Canada has not emerged in 
the Australia-USA context. The comparative data shows Australia raced ahead of USA both in 
labour productivity and total factor productivity in the latter half of the 1990s (Table 1). But in 
terms of productive capital stocks in information technology Australia bereft of robust IT 
producing sector lags far behind USA the NE par excellence. The plummeting value of the dollar 
could have three types of adverse effects exacerbating the divergence of the inter-country 
productivity gap between USA and Australia. Three ‘smoking guns’ have been blamed the 
occurrence of these divergent trends: 1. The factor cost effect due to rise in the price of imports 
reducing investment in IT and thereby slowing down the growth of the NE. 2. The escalation of 
the innovation gap due to retardation of innovation and R&D because of high costs of imported 
IT hardware and goods. 3. The slowdown of the process of ‘creative destruction’ of the low 
productivity firms by prolonging their life due to protection offered by a low value of the dollar 
(Harris, 2000). These ‘smoking guns’ warn that the plummeting value of the Australian dollar 
could only slowdown any prospects of emerging as robust ‘new economy’ in a world 
overshadowed by the super ‘new economy’ of the USA.  
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